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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF NAVAL
JUSTICE*
L IKE all other branches of law, that portion of naval
law which controls naval justice was subjected to
change during the war years. It is proposed to deal with
these developments under two main heads: (1) the changes
consummated, and (2) the changes contemplated.
I. CHANGES CONSUMMATED
A. Jurisdiction Over Murder
Jurisdiction of naval courts over the crime of murder was
restricted both as to persons and as to places. Article 6
of the Articles for the Government of the Navy,1 at the be-
ginning of World War II, read:
If any person belonging to any public vessel of the United
States commits the crime of murder without the territorial
jurisdiction thereof, he may be tried by court-martial and
punished with death.
In 1942, a seaman named Rosborough was serving on de-
tached duty as a member of the armed guard crew in the
Motor Ship Baltic, under the command of a lieutenant of
*The opinions or assertions contained in this article are the private ones of
the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the
Navy Department or the naval service at large.
1 Revised Statutes, sec. 1624.
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our naval reserve. The ship was under Panamanian reg-
istry, and on June 30th of that year was moored to a dock
at Montevideo, Uruguay. Rosborough, while intoxicated,
shot and killed the chief officer of the ship. He was first
detained by the local police, but was later released to the
custody of the U. S. Navy. He was returned to New York,
and was tried by a general court martial on a charge of
murder. The Navy's ,theory of this case 2 was that Article
6 was not exclusive, but merely limited the murder cases
in which the death penalty might be imposed, and that
Rosborough's offense could be tried under the general
article,3 although life imprisonment was the maxdmum un-
der that article.4 He was found guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter, as a lesser and included offense of murder. On
a writ of habeas corpus in 1944, the United States District
Court in Maine sustained the Navy's theory, ' but on appeal
the following year the decision was reversed.6 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that where any Specific
offense was enumerated in the articles preceding the general
article, jurisdiction over that offense must be determined ex-
clusively by the applicable article. This decision was not
further contested by the government, and Rosborough was
released. The two-year statute of limitations ' having al-
ready run, he could not be tried again.'
Just three months before the final determination of the
Rosborough case, three enlisted men of the Navy who were
based on shore on the captured Japanese island of Saipan
stalked an Army nurse with intent to rape her. The nurse
was strolling along a beach with an Army officer. When
2 Navy Court-martial Order (hereafter cited CMO) 1-1942, 187-189.
3 Article 22 (a) of the Articles for the Government of the Navy (hereafter
cited AGN), providing for "all offenses ... not specified in the foregoing articles".
4 AGN 50 states that the death penalty is limited to the offenses for which
it is expressly provided in AGN.
5 Rosborough v. Rossell, 56 F. Supp. 347 (1944); CMO 3-1944, 518.
6 Rosborough v. Rossell, 150 F. (2d) 809 (1945); CMO 9-1945, 399.
7 AGN 61.
8 CMO 3-1946, 95.
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they were intercepted, the officer defended the nurse, firing
a pistol bullet into the leg of one of the attackers. Another
of the attackers then 'unlimbered a sub-machine gun and
murdered both the officer and the nurse. These three crim-
inals, although they were not attached to a public vessel,
were tried by a court martial for murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment, in accord with the Navy's theory in the
Rosborough trial. Upon review of the case, following the
mandate of the Circuit Court in the Rosborough appeal,
the conviction had to be set aside.9 They were subsequently
convicted by another court martial for voluntary man-
slaughter, to which offense the restriction relating to their
belonging to a public vessel did not apply. It was apparent
that this restrictioh as to a murder charge should be removed.
The interpretation of federal "territorial jurisdiction"
gave some trouble, too. It was for many years the opinion
that territories and possessions acquired after the enactment
of Article 6 in 1862, were excluded from consideration in de-
ducing the intent of Congress in using the words "territorial
jurisdiction." At that time, the United States had no out-
lying possessions beyond the seas. It was therefore believed
that the Territory of Hawaii was "without" the federal
jurisdiction intended by the article, and therefore within
court martial jurisdiction.10 In 1946, however, a murder
on a vessel in Honolulu harbor was held to have been com-
mitted within federal territorial jurisdiction, and the con-
viction was set aside on jurisdictional grounds. 1 Murder
on a public vessel at Midway Island in the Pacific, however,
has been held within court-martial jurisdiction. 2
Congress late in 1945 amended Article 6 to read: 13
9 CMO 4-1946, 144.
10 While the draft opinion dated Nov. 1, 1945, file A17/20, JAG, Navy, in
the case of Ensign Matthew Wrublewski, expressly so held, the final opinion
signed Nov. 9, 1945, did so only by implication, the murder conviction being set
aside solely upon the ground that the accused did not belong to a public vessel.
11 JAG, Navy, file MM-Cleo Boyd, A17/20, dated Jan. 3, 1946.
12 JAG, Navy, file MM-Clark, Manual L., A17/20, dated Jan. 29, 1946.
13 Act of Dec. 4, 1945, c. 5.54, 54 Stat. 595, Title 34 U. S. C. A. 1200, Art. 6.
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If any person subject to the Articles for the Government
of the Navy commits the crime of murder without the terri-
torial jurisdiction of any particular State, or the District of
Columbia, he may be tried by court martial and punished with
death.
This language completely clarified jurisdiction as to persons,
and changed the test of jurisdiction as to place from non-
federal to non-state.
B. Jurisdiction Over Civilians
The jurisdiction over civilians was, prior to World War
II, vague and indefinite. The Navy had always claimed
jurisdiction over civilians attached to or on duty with naval
forces in a theater of war, but refrained from laying down
any general rule. 4 The assertion of military control over
such civilians seemed to have the support of the federal
courts, 5 but a trial in the naval service had to be by an ex-
ceptional military court, such as a military commission." A
naval court martial had no jurisdiction over such civilians.
In the middle of World War II, Congress enlarged the
scope of the jurisdiction of naval courts by including certain
persons not in the naval service." Such persons fell into
two categories: (1) those not in military service who are
outside continental United States accompanying or serving
with the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard (when it is
serving as a part of the Navy), and (2) those not in military
service within an area leased by the United States which is
outside United States territorial jurisdiction and under the
control of the Secretary of the Navy. The first group in-
cluded, but was not limited to government employees and
persons employed by contractors and subcontractors en-
gaged in naval projects.'" This new jurisdiction cannot be
14 Naval Courts and Boards (hereafter cited NC&B) (1923), sec. 558.
15 gx Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866); Ex parte Ger-
lach, 247 Fed. 616 (1917).
16 NC&B (1923), sec. 558, note 23.
17 Act of Mar. 22, 1943, c. 18, 57 Stat. 41, Title 34 U.S.CA. 1201.
18 Ibid.
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exercised except during war or national emergency, and even
then it does not extend to Alaska, the Canal Zone, the Ha-
waiian Islands, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands, in all of
which places there are federal courts. It applies to all other
places, however, specifically including the islands of Pal-
myra, Midway and Johnston, and that part of the Aleutian
Islands west of longitude 1720 West. Such civilians may be
tried for all naval offenses 19 except those "of such a nature
that they can be committed only by naval personnel." 2
Congress intended 21 to make this naval jurisdiction over
civilians comparable to that which had been given to the
Army in 1920.22 An Army court martial can try a civilian
for attempting to desert,2" desertion,24 disobedience of law-
ful and applicable orders,25 and even for offenses under the
general article,' as well as for civil crimes like theft.' It
must therefore be concluded that naval courts martial now
have similar power, and that the restriction in the statute
refers only to violations of those laws, orders, regulations,
and customs which can lawfully be applied only to persons
under duties and responsibilities incident to their naval
status. A civilian would not be triable for fraudulent enlist-
ment,28 or for enlisting an intoxicated person in the Navy,29
or for failing to salute the quarterdeck upon coming aboard
a man-o'-war.8 ° The mere fact that an offense is one known
19 See Hearings before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 77th Cong., 2nd
Session (1942) on S. 2899.
20 Act of Mar. 22, 1943, loc. cit. supra note 17.
21 See Report No. 1811, 77th Cong., 2nd Session (1942) on S. 2899.
22 By Article of War (hereafter cited AW) 2 (d).
28 EX parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.C.N.J. 1918).
24 McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943), noted 44 CoT. L
REv. 575-78 (1944) and 30 CoRNzrL L. Q. 108-11 (1944-45).
25 Ez Parte Gerlach, ioc. cit. supra note 15.
26 See In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944).
27 In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Perlstein v. U. S., 57
F. Supp. 123 (M. D. Pa. 1944).
28 Because after such enlistment, the enlistee is a de jure member of the
naval service, not a civilian. In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 11 Sup. Ct. 54, 34 L. ed.
636 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 57, 34 L. ed. 644 (1890).
29 Because this offense can be committed only by an officer. AGN 19.
80 Because the custom applies only to servicemen.
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only to the military or naval service, and not to the civil law,
however, does not mean that a civilian subject to naval law
cannot be tried for it by a court martial.
C. Effect of Conviction of Desertion in Time of War
After World War I, the Navy had held that a person con-
victed of desertion in time of war not only should be
sentenced to be discharged with a dishonorable discharge,
but that he could not be legally retained in the naval service
under any conditions.81 This was based upon a law, origi-
nally enacted during the Civil War, which provided that such
deserters are deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and
forfeited their rights of citizenship, as well as their right to
become citizens, and that they shall be forever incapable of
holding any office of trust or profit under the United States,
or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof.8 When ex-
ceptional cases arose in which these severe penalties were
not deemed appropriate, the Navy Department fell back
on the theory that a finding of guilty by a court martial did
not legally become a conviction until it had been approved
by the convening authority. It suggested that if the con-
vening authority desired to retain the accused in the service,
yet hesitated to disapprove the finding of the court martial,
the proper course was to withhold all action on the case for
a definite period with a view to withholding action in-
definitely should the conduct of the accused warrant.88 This
course avoided the "conviction," and, in effect, placed the
accused on probation, a result which was believed illegal if
accomplished by the normal method of approving the find-
ing and then conditionally suspending the sentence.3 4 When,
by the Nationality Act of 1940, Congress consolidated the
laws relating to the acquisition and loss of nationality, the
81 CMO 280-1919, 10-11.
32 Revised Statutes, sections 1996 and 1998.
88 CMO 2-1921, 18.
34 Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-33539 of April 26, 1943 (unpublished).
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provision for the loss of nationality through "conviction" by
a court martial of desertion in time of war was retained. 5
During World War II, a case arose in which a Marine
private named Krogfus was found guilty of desertion in time
of war, and the convening authority by his approval had
made that finding a legal conviction. The Commandant of
the Marine Corps, however, wanted to return Krogfus to
duty on probation. The Judge Advocate General admitted
that no action could be taken unless the Secretary of the
Navy retained a reserve power to mitigate the sentence al-
ready confirmed. He-reasoned that in 1909 the Secretary
was given the power to set aside the proceedings or remit
or mitigate, in whole or in part, the sentence imposed by any
naval court martial convened by his order or by that of
any officer of the Navy or Marine Corps," and that none of
the statutes enacted since that time prohibited the retention
in the naval service of a person convicted of wartime deser-
tion, or impaired the reserve powers expressly given to the
Secretary. 7 He concluded that even though Krogfus may
lose his United States citizenship, he may still be required
to perform military service for the United States, and that
the Secretary of the Navy may use his mitigating power to
retain Krogfus in the service notwithstanding the convic-
tion. 8 This view was, in the year following, incorporated
in an amendment to the Nationality Act 89 providing that
loss of nationality follows, not from the mere conviction of
wartime desertion, but from a dismissal or dishonorable dis-
charge executed as a result of such conviction. The amend-
ment further provided that the restoration to active duty
during wartime or the re-enlistment or induction in time of
war with permission of competent military or naval author-
35 Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1168, Title 8 U.S.C.A. 801.
86 Act of Feb. 16, 1909, c. 131, sec. 9, 35 Stat. 621, Title 34 U.S.C.A. 1200,
Art. 94(b).
87 MO 2-1943, 92.
38 Id. at 95-96.
30 Act of Jan. 20, 1944, c. 2, sec. 1, 58 Stat. 4, Title 8 U.S.C.A. 801 (g).
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ity has the immediate effect of restoring citizenship and all
civil and political rights, and removing all disabilities so
lost.4"
D. Mandatory Not-Guilty Plea to Wartime Desertion
The serious results of a conviction of wartime desertion
were not generally known to the rank and file of that great
body of people who joined the naval service during the World
War II. The naval population jumped from a peacetime
strength of about 100,000 to over four millions. There were
5,344 convictions of desertion, only two of which were officer
cases. A section of the Navy's court-martial manual 4' called
attention to the fact that the sentence in a case of wartime
desertion must provide for dismissal or dishonorable dis-
charge, and that the convicted person would be "forever in-
capable of holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States," but the vast majority of the men in uniform
never had the time to read the manual. In March of 1942,
an order was issued which required that this section of the
Manual be carefully explained to the accused by the judge
advocate before trial, and that an entry be made in the
record of proceedings that this had been done.4" The pur-
pose of this requirement was to assure to the accused an op-
portunity to avail himself, upon the trial, of all defenses open
to him, but it was not entirely effectual. Failure to conform
to the order in cases where the accused's plea of guilty was
accepted resulted in the offer of a new trial. Where the
accused pleaded not guilty and the issue was in fact tried,
the failure to comply with the order was held, upon review,
non-prejudicial."3  Later, as a matter of policy, the Secre-
tary of the Navy directed that, in all cases of desertion, a
plea of not guilty must be entered for the accused, and that
40 Ibid.
41 NC&B (1937), sec. 444.
42 Alnav 64 of Mar. 31, 1942.
48 CMO 1-1942, 254; CMO 1-1943, 65-67.
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evidence must be taken." This was the first time in naval
law that a not-guilty plea was made mandatory to a charge.
E. Pleading Unauthorized Absence
The volume of absence offenses, about eighty per cent of
all offenses tried by naval courts martial during World War
II, made necessary a clarification of the theory upon which
such cases rest. When a man who was absent without au-
thority from his station reported at another station, it wac
held that his action in reporting, even for a temporary pur-
pose, had the effect of terminating his period of unauthor-
ized absence.45 This view was changed on May 1, 1945,
and the Army's view adopted, so that an unauthorized
absence was considered terminated, not by any action of
the absentee, but by the action of competent authority which
exercised control over the absentee. Where the absentee
reported, for example, to a distant naval hospital, but was
not admitted as a patient, his unauthorized absence was not
terminated by his visit to the hospital, and he was guilty of
absence for the entire period until he returned to a station
where control was exercised over him.'
A man may be guilty of absence from a station to which
he has never reported. If he is under orders to report for
duty at a new station, and becomes absent without leave
enroute, he is guilty of unauthorized absence from the time
he was due to report there. This normal result is not
changed now by the fact that the man secretly returned to
his old station and lived there without competent authority
having exercised any control over him.47 It would not be
changed by the fact that his orders authorized a delay, to
count as a leave of absence, enroute to the new station, be-
cause such delay would have expired prior to his scheduled
44 Sec. Nay. letter of Oct. 17, 1946, published in Navy Department Bulletin
of Oct. 31, 1946, as item 46-2041.
45 CMO 2-1943, 24-25.
46 CMO 7-1946, 239.
47 CMO 7-1946, 240.
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time of arrival at the new station, and any absence beyond
that time is properly chargeable as absence without leave.
F. Fraudulent Underage Ertistments
The Navy had long recognized the rule that a boy who
was under the age of fourteen was under an absolute dis-
ability to enlist."8 This was based upon the statute which
makes penal the enlistment of such minors.4" The only fed-
eral case on this point is Haskins v. Pell,5" which held that
a statute which forbade enlistment into the Army, of minors
under the age of sixteen, negatived the competency of such
a minor to acquire the status of soldier while he was under
sixteen. The court, in dictum, admitted, however, that by
continuing in service until he reached the age which qualified
him, the minor might validate his underage enlistment.5
One of the three judges dissented from the opinion of the
court. The Army has rejected the opinion,52 and the Navy,
although at first accepting it,5" has since distinguished and
limited it, following only the dictum.54 A boy, who en-
listed in the Navy when he was thirteen, committed fraud
after passing his fourteenth birthday. It was held that his
enlistment was validated by his continuing to serve and re-
ceive pay until and beyond the minimum age of fourteen
years, and that he was triable by a court martial for an
offense thereafter committed.5"
G. Other Changes
A number of other changes of lesser interest to the legal
profession might be briefly mentioned. The statutory au-
48 See NC&B (1937), sec. 333.
49 Revised Statutes, sec. 1624, Art. 19, as amended by Acts of May 12, 1879,
c. 5, 21 Stat. 3, and Aug. 22, 1912, c. 336, sec. 2, 37 Stat. 356; Title 34 U.S.C.A.
1200, Art. 19.
50 239 Fed. 279 (C.C.A. 5th, 1917), L. R. A. 1917D 1053.
51 Ibid.
52 1918 OP. JAG, ARmy, 357, DIGEST JAG, ARMY, 1912-1930, sec. 1330.
58 CMO 1-1942, 143, 144.
54 CMO 5-1945, 195.
55 Ibid.
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thority for the convening of general courts martial has been
broadened. The old law " specifying the persons authorized
to convene these courts made the authority wider in time of
war. The new law 57 eliminated the distinction between
times of war and times of peace. It retained the two basic
divisions of authority, the one by law, the other by delega-
tion, but greatly increased the scope of the power of the Sec-
retary of the Navy to delegate such authority. The result,
although inevitably including what Mr. Delmar Karlen 58
calls "the dispersion of discretionary power," has so reduced
the time interval between the accusation and the promulga-
tion of the sentence as to prove Its efficiency. The Secre-
tary, who used to be forced to convene all general courts
martial held in continental United States, now has to con-
vene very few such courts.
Another change related to the pleading in fraud cases. The
punishment for fraud is "fine and imprisonment, or such
other punishment as a court martial may adjudge." "' Be-
cause the "or" was read as the disjunctive, the Navy's man-
ual specified that it was necessary to prefer two charges,
Fraud, and Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and
Discipline, the latter to allow dismissal or discharge to be
added to fine and imprisonment.0 0 The theory was that
the one act constituted two offenses, one being a fraud on
the government, the other an act tending to disrupt the ad-
ministration of the Navy. 1 This theory was revised in 1946,
the Judge Advocate General holding that almost any offens6
tends to disrupt to some extent the administration of dis-
cipline, and that the addition of the general charge was not
warranted. Further, he held that the language quoted above
need not be restricted to the alternative, and that the his-
50 Revised Statutes, sec. 1624, Art. 38.
57 Act of Feb. 12, 1946, 60 Stat. 4, Title 34 U.S.C.A. 1200, Art. 38.
58 Karlen, The Personal Factor in Military Justice, 1946 Wis. L. Rrv. 394,
406.
59 AGN 14 (Italics supplied).
60 NC&B (1937), sec. 80.
61 Ibid.
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tory of the statutory offense of fraud warranted the inter-
pretation of "or" as "and." 62 Authority cited for this inter-
pretation was found in the Supreme Court case of Carter v.
McClaugkry.63
The war brought considerable confusion regarding proof
of unauthorized absence by service records. Ships would
sail without the absentees, leaving behind their service rec-
ord books for use upon the apprehension and trial of the
offenders. Frequently there was not time for the making of
appropriate entries in these records prior to the sailing of
the ships, and the entries were made by a shore-based com-
manding officer to whom the offenders were transferred in
absentia by "staff returns." Prior to 1946, it had been held
that service record entries, to be admissible in evidence, must
contain facts within the personal knowledge of the officer
who signed the entry, 4 despite the fact that Congress in
1936 had enacted a law providing that, for records made in
the regular course of business, lack of personal knowledge
may affect the weight but not the admissibility of such rec-
ords.65 This rule applied to "any court of the United States
and . . . any court established by Act of Congress." 66 It
seems to conflict with the right of confrontation guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, which was a common-law right
having recognized exceptions.6 7 The subject matter of the
1936 statute was not one of these exceptions. An earlier
attempt by Congress to restrict the right of confrontation 68
had been held to violate the Sixth Amendment. 9 But a fed-
eral court has held that the 1936 rule does not contravene
that Amendment,7 and the new Federal Rules of Criminal
62 JAG, Navy, file MM-Klaric, Martin J., dated May 9, 1946.
63 183 U. S. 365, 22 Sup. Ct. 181, 46 L. ed. 236 (1902).
64 CMO 2-1944, 358.
65 Act of June 20, 1926, c. 640, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1161-62, Title 28 U. S. C. A.
66 Ibid.
67 Salinger v. U. S., 272 U. S. 542, 548, 47 Sup. Ct. 173, 71 L. ed. 398 (1926).
68 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 479.
69 Kirby v. U. S., 174 U. S. 47, 19 Sup. Ct. 574, 43 L. ed. 890 (1899).
70 U. S. v. Leathers, 135 F. (2d) 507, 511 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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Procedure leave the door wide open for statutory modifica-
tion of the rules of evidence.7' The Navy, in March of
1946, abandoned the personal knowledge requirement.7"
The only requirement now is that the entry must have been
made as a matter of official duty. This duty extends to the
recording of facts not within personal knowledge and to the
securing of authentic information with respect to such facts.
The extent of the authority of the person who made the en-
try is the controlling factor in deciding admissibility, and it
is presumed that the person signing had the requisite author-
ity unless there is evidence which casts doubt on his quali-
fications or on the veracity of the entry.7"
II. CHANGES CONTEMPLATED
The Navy prepared a bill containing many amendments to
the Articles for the Government of the Navy, which was in-
troduced into the Eightieth Congress as H.R. 3687 and as
S. 1338 (star print). In addition, changes in the adminis-
tration of naval justice which required no legislative author-
ity were approved by the Secretary of the Navy for issuance
under executive authority.
A. Jurisdiction As to Persons
There are two new classes of persons over which it is con-
templated that naval jurisdiction be extended. One of these
embodies enlisted regulars who are placed upon the retired
list with pay. Such retired enlisted personnel are not now
subject to naval law,74 although retired regular officers 75 and
retired reserve personnel " are. The other new class is that
of court-martial prisoners in naval custody. Under present
71 Rule 26. See notes under this rule prepared by the Advisory Committee,
as published by the New York University School of Law (1946), pages 44-45.
72 CMO 9-1946, 179.
73 Ibid. See NC&B (1937), sec. 199.
74 CMO 9-1922, 11; Laws Relating to the Navy, Annotated (1945), 438.
75 Revised Statutes, sec. 1457.
76 Act of June 25, 1938, c. 690, title I, sec. 6, 56 Stat. 1176, Title 34 U. S.
C. A. 853d.
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law, an offense committed by a court-martial prisoner while
in confinement but after the term of his enlistment has ex-
pired cannot be tried by a naval court martial."7 An officer
dismissed and imprisoned is not within court-martial jurisdic-
tion, and cannot be tried by a court martial for an offense
committed while in confinement. Jurisdiction over such pris-
oners will give to the Navy the same power that the Army
possesses over its prisoners."
There is one class of persons now subject to naval law
which the Navy has recommended be removed from naval
jurisdiction. Present law provides that a person may be
brought from civilian life before a naval court martial and
tried for fraud against the government committed while he
was in the naval service.79 The practically identical provi-
sion in Army law 80 was considered by Winthrop to be of
doubtful constitutionality 81 and its constitutionality was de-
nied in an opinion in a recent federal case.8" The Navy pro-
poses that the present naval law on this subject be repealed,
primarily upon the consideration that such a civilian can be
tried in the federal courts for the fraud against the govern-
ment which he allegedly committed.83
B. Jurisdiction As to Place
The Navy bill clarifies jurisdiction as to place by stating
expressly the general rule that naval law extends to all
places, and by providing that as to offenses named or de-
77 CMO 11-1928, 11.
78 See AW 2.
79 AGN 14, Eleventh.
80 AW 94.
81 W3NTHRop, MArrAY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 2nd ed. 1896, reprint 1920,
92-93, 105, and 710.
82 U. S. ex. rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, Second Service Command,
69 F. Supp. 661 (1946). The decision in this case was reversed on stipulation upon
appeal, the Army releasing the accused and dropping all charges.
8 Under Chapter 5 of the Federal Criminal Code. The Army, on the
other hand, proposes that the Army's corresponding court-martial jurisdiction
be further extended to include persons separated from the military service sftbse-
quently charged with frauds not connected with government funds or property.
H.R. 2575 and S. 903, identical bills, Eightieth Congress, sec. 37.
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scribed in the Federal Criminal Code and other penal
statutes, which are adopted by reference, the territorial re-
strictions contained therein shall not apply. Under Chapter
11 of the Code, certain acts are punishable only when com-
mitted within the admiralty, maritime, or territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Offenses under that chapter in-
clude murder, rape, and carnal knowledge. Under Chapter
12, piracy and other offenses are punishable only when com-
mitted on the high seas or on American waters. Under
Chapter 13, offenses such as unlawful cohabitation are pun-
ishable only when committed in a Territory, District, or
other place within exclusive federal jurisdiction. All these
offenses, under the Navy bill, would be punishable by naval
courts martial when committed anywhere by persons sub-
ject to naval law.
It is proposed to repeal Article 6 of the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, which now limits jurisdiction over
murder to murder committed outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the states and of the District of Columbia. Instead,
the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code 84 as to first and
second degree murder will be adopted, giving to naval law
for the first time a distinction between degrees of murder, and
removing all statutory restrictions based upon place. As a
matter of policy, the Navy intends, in time of peace, to de-
liver to civil authorities for trial offenders alleged to have
committed murder within the jurisdiction of civil courts
whenever the interest of the civilian community is para-
mount to that of the naval service.
C. Jurisdiction as to Time.
It is proposed to eliminate the double standard created by
the special provision of existing law that the statute of limi-
tations as to desertion in peacetime does not begin to run
until the end of the term of enlistment.85 The Navy bill re-
84 Title 18 U. S. C. A. 452.
S5 AGN 62. Compare AGN 61.
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tains the two-year statute of limitations, but provides uni-
formity in period of amenability. It further provides that
four offenses be excepted from the statute of limitations.
These are mutiny, murder, unauthorized absence in time of
war, and desertion in time of war. As to other offenses, the
statute is operative and may be tolled by the signing of
charges and specifications within the statutory period. In
computing this period, any time during which the accused
was fleeing from justice or was in the custody of civil au-
thorities is excluded.
The effect of a discharge is clarified by the Navy bill. It
is proposed that a discharge shall not operate to relieve an
offender permanently from amenability to trial by court
martial. A discharge will terminate jurisdiction, subject to
the reattachment of jurisdiction upon the person again be-
coming subject to naval law. Thus a person who re-enlists
may be tried for offenses committed in the prior enlistment,
if the statute of limitations has not run. So also may an
officer who resigns and is later recommissioned or enlisted or
inducted. The general rule remains intact, that a person
must have been subject to naval law both at the time of the
commission of the offense and at the time of trial. There
are a few exceptions to this rule, as in regard to spies and
saboteurs, who until they were charged may not have been
subject to naval law. Deserters who fraudulently enlist and
are subsequently discharged from the fraudulent enlistment
would still be deserters from the earlier enlistment, and
their intermediate discharge would not, under the proposed
law, afford any immunity to them. Persons alleged to have
fraudulently obtained their discharge and former officers
who demand trial after having been dismissed by order of
the President would be considered to be initially subject to
the jurisdiction of courts martial only for the limited pur-
pose of trial for the offenses connected with such discharges
or dismissals. Their trials would, in effect, be determina-
tions of the validity of their discharges and dismissals. If
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the determination of such a trial be to invalidate the sepa-
ration from the service, then the person concerned would be
considered to have been continuously subject t. naval law
as if the separation had never occurred, and he would then
be amenable to trial for any offense committed during any
period in which he was thus subject to naval law.
D. Jurisdiction as to Offenses
The proposed law enumerates as offenses many of the acts
and omissions which, under present law, were unspecified
and which were punished under the general article."8 Thus
the scope of the new general article 87 is greatly narrowed.
Among the specified offenses, AWOL 8 and AOL '9 have
been combined in one offense, to be known as "absence from
place of duty without authority." This will avoid many
embarrassing entanglements in pleading and procedure.
Under present practise, proof of AOL under a charge of
AWOL results in a conviction in a lesser degree than
charged, whereas proof of AWOL under a charge of AOL
results in a mandatory acquittal. Under the interpretation
of present law, the unauthorized absence must be from naval
jurisdiction and not merely from the place of duty. Actu-
ally, the fact that the absentee goes beyond the limits of
his ship or station is only an aggravating circumstance, and
would be so viewed if the Navy bill becomes law.
The court-martial jurisdiction over certain civilians which
was given to the Navy in 1943 90 is retained in the proposed
law, but the limitation, that they cannot be tried for
"offenses of such a nature that they can be committed only
by naval personnel," has been deleted. The limiting clause
was considered merely declaratory of the principle that a
86 AGN 22(a), making punishable "all offenses . . . not specified!'
87 Proposed AGN 9, Sixty-first.
88 Absence without leave.
89 Absence over leave; technically, absence from station and duty alter
leave had expired.
90 See section I. B. of this article.
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civilian cannot be tried for an act or omission which, by its
very nature, depends upon the naval status of the offender.
For example, a civilian cannot be tried for failure to salute
an officer. He can be tried, however, for disobedience of
lawful orders, desertion, and prejudicial conduct. Trial of
civilians by Army courts martial for such offenses have
been upheld,9' and it is clear from Congressional hearings
that the 1943 law was intended to give to the Navy a juris-
diction over civilians comparable to that which had been
given to the Army.92 The limitation as to offenses, which
does not appear in Army law,93 served only to confuse the
scope of the jurisdiction granted.
The offenses contained in the Federal Criminal Code
would, without the territorial limitations there expressed,
become naval offenses under the Navy bill. The bill also
contains a provision which can be likened to the Assimilative
Crimes Act.9 4 Under this provision, violations of such crim-
inal laws of a State, Territory, District, or possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision thereof, in which
the acts or omissions occurred, as are in force at the date on
which the bill becomes law and also at the time they occur-
red, are punishable as naval offenses. Such violations have
heretofore been punished on the theory that the mere viola-
tion of a law, foreign or domestic, was a violation of a cus-
tom of the naval service.95 The proposed law eliminates the
necessity for reliance upon such a theory, and gives all the
statutory jurisdiction over such violations which is within
the constitutional power of the national legislature to give.9"
91 Ex parte Falls, loc. cit. supra note 23; McCune v. Kilpatrick, loc. cit.
supra note 24; Ex parte Gerlach, loc. cit. supra note 25; In re Berue, loc. cit.
supra note 26.
92 Supra notes 19 and 21.
93 See AW 2.
94 Title 18 U. S. C. A. 468.
95 CMO 30-1918, 176; NC&B (1937), sections 59 and 98.
96 An attempted adoption of future laws would be an unconstitutional dele-
gation of purely legislative authority. U. S. v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141, 8 L. ed. 348
(1832); Franklin v. U. S., 216 U. S. 559, 568, 30 Sup. Ct. 434, 54 L. ed. 615
(1910); Washington, P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Magruder, 198 Fed. 218, 222 (D. C. Md.
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The bill enumerates violations of treaties and of the law
of war as offenses against naval law. This was inserted to
complete the jurisdictional picture in one document, but is
merely declaratory of existing international law and creates
no offenses which were not already cognizable by naval
courts martial. The restrictions and limitations which, un-
der international law, apply to such offenses " are not abro-
gated.
E. Pre-trial Investigation
An investigation of all complaints is required by present
regulations.9 8  But under proposed regulations, a formal
pre-trial investigation will be conducted where a complaint,
if true, would warrant trial by a general or a summary court
martial. The alleged offender will have defense counsel, will
have the right to cross-examine available witnesses against
him and to call and examine available witnesses in his behalf.
The investigation will be conducted by one officer, and the
testimony will be taken under oath and recorded. The
alleged offender will be permitted to submit anything in his
behalf that he desires, not only matter admissible as evidence,
but also ex parte affidavits, and to make an unsworn state-
ment. The investigating officer will make a report, which,
with the record of the investigation, will be submifted to the
authority empowered to convene the appropriate type of
court. Prior to taking the action of ordering the trial of the
alleged offender, the convening authority should obtain the
written opinion of his staff legal officer as to whether such
probable cause is indicated as to warrant trial. The pre-
trial investigation as proposed corresponds closely to that
provided by statute for the Army.99 It is not to be a trial,
1912); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011, 1018 (W. D. Wash. 1916). For the
history of the Assimilative Crimes Acts, see Williams v. U. S., 327 U. S. 711, 66 Sup.
Ct. 778, 90 L. ed. 962 (1946).
97 Such as the requirement that a spy be found in the zone of operations
(Hague Rules, Art. 29), or the immunity of a spy who succeeds in returning tc
his own forces but is subsequently captured. Hague Rules, Art. 31.
98 NAvY REGu.ATIONS (1920), Articles 213 and 902.
99 AW 70.
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but an impartial hearing to determine whether probable
cause exists.
If, at the subsequent trial, the accused pleads guilty, it is
intended that the pre-trial papers be attached to the record
of proceedings of the trial after the trial is completed. This
will not be done if the accused objects. The purpose, how-
ever, is to provide facts for the Sentence Review and Clem-
ency Board upon which it may base clemency action. With-
out such facts, the record is destitute, and grounds for re-
ducing the sentence in conformity with a policy-approved
pattern, although they may exist, do not appear. The pro-
posed regulation for attachment of the pre-trial papers is one
designed to benefit the accused.
It is intended to utilize the pre-trial investigative proce-
dure also for probation violators. Where it appears that
termination of probation involving confinement or discharge
might be appropriate, the investigation will be required by
regulations. The proceedings will be transcribed. All perti-
nent papers will, in time of peace, go to the Navy Depart-
ment and a discharge will not be issued until after they are
reviewed. In time of war, they will go to the authority to
whom the Secretary of the Navy had delegated his confirm-
ing power in such cases. This procedure will insure that
persons on probation from sentences involving confinement
and discharge are not deprived of their opportunity to make
good by their commission of slight infractions of discipline.
F. Mast Punishment
A new mast punishment of loss of pay is incorporated into
the Navy bill. The maximum to be imposed is one-half of
one month's pay, and it is an alternative, not an additional,
mast punishment. It may be imposed only in time of war,
national emergency, or, by special authority of the Secretary
of the Navy, in extraordinary circumstances in time of
peace. It may be imposed upon officers only by high rank-
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ing officers who have the authority to convene a general
court martial, and upon enlisted persons only by officers who
have the authority to convene summary courts martial. A
full report is required in each case. This new punishment
will make it unnecessary in many cases to take recourse to
court martial proceedings, and the need for it in wartime has
long been apparent. It will be especially useful as a punish-
ment upon officers. Except for private reprimand, all the
punishments allowed under present law deprive the com-
manding officer, who imposes punishment, of the services of
the officer offender for the period of the punishment. The
new provision for loss of pay does not have this disadvan-
tage.
G. Powers of Naval Courts Martial
It is proposed to change the name of the most inferior
naval court from "deck court" to "deck court martial" in
order to bring it into conformity with the names of other
naval judicial bodies. Its powers will, under the proposed
law, be somewhat increased, so that it can impose thirty
days confinement instead of twenty. The powers of the in-
termediate naval court, the summary court martial, will also
be increased, so that it can impose six months confinement
instead of two. This increase will close the present gap be-
tween the two-month maximum of a summary court martial
and the six-month minimum practised by a general court
martial. It will greatly reduce the number of trials by gen-
eral courts martial and will obviate the necessity of resorting
to that type of court for minor offenses deserving of greater
punishment than a summary court martial can presently im-
pose.
There will be no substantial change in the powers of a
general court martial, but the Navy bill reduces the number
of offenses for which, under existing law, the statutory maxi-
mum punishment is death. No longer will the death penalty
be available for disobedience of a superior officer's orders,
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striking a superior officer on duty, failure to inform authori-
ties of the receipt of an enemy message, leaving station be-
fore being regularly relieved, or unlawful destruction of pub-
lic property.
H. Evidence
The Navy bill provides statutory authority for the Secre-
tary of the Navy to promulgate rules of procedure, including
modes of proof, and directs that, insofar as applicable, such
modes of proof shall follow the law of evidence prevailing in
the district courts of the United States in the trial of criminal
cases. Express authority now exists for the prescription of
procedure in deck courts'0 0 and summary courts mar-
tial,l10 but, if the bill becomes law, this will be the first time
that express statutory authority has been given for prescrib-
ing the procedure of general courts martial, or the modes of
proof. The sixty-page chapter on evidence in the present
Navy manual 102 was issued with the approval of the Presi-
dent under the general authority of Revised Statutes, sec-
tion 1547. The new provision omits the necessity of Presi-
dential approval, and authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to
promulgate the rules of procedure and modes of proof. With
respect to the modes of proof, the Secretary of the Navy is
bound to adopt the applicable law of evidence as practised in
the federal courts in criminal trials.'03
I. Procedure of Courts Martial
The procedure of naval courts martial will be greatly im-
proved under contemplated new regulations. Opening state-
ments will be allowed for the first time. Provision will be
100 AGN 64(e).
101 AGN 34.
102 NC&B (1937), chapter III.
103 Note the difference between this proposed provision of AGN and the
corresponding provision of the Army's AW 38. The former prescribes that the
federal rules of evidence be adopted "insofar as applicable" as naval law; the
latter, "in so far as he (i. e., the Secretary of War) shall deem practicable" as
military law.
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made for a motion for a finding of not guilty, corresponding
to a motion to dismiss in civil courts. In general courts
martial, the judge advocate will have no prosecution duties,
and will be a person certified by the Judge Advocate General
as qualified to perform his legal duties, and responsible to
that officer for the performance of those duties. He will have
power to rule on all interlocutory questions, except chal-
lenges, subject to being overruled by a majority vote of the
members of the court martial. In the event of overruling,
the reasons are to be spread upon the record. There will
also be a prosecutor and a defense counsel appointed for each
general court martial, and these two will also be certified by
and responsible to the Judge Advocate General. The ac-
cused may, of course, have counsel of his own choice, either
in addition to or in lieu of the regularly appointed defense
counsel. It will be required by law that defense counsel in a
not-guilty-plea case resulting in conviction attach a brief of
such matters as he feels should be considered on behalf of
the accused on review, or, in lieu thereof, a signed state-
ment setting out his reasons for not doing so. This re-
quirement is a safeguard to the accused, to assure an intelli-
gent and complete review.
In a summary court martial, the present "recorder" will
become the "prosecutor", and his present duties of advising
as to the law will devolve upon the three-officer court mar-
tial, one member of which will, whenever practicable, be a
legally trained officer. Legal rulings will be made by the
court. Defense counsel will be automatically appointed by
the convening authority from among qualified personnel
available.
In a deck court martial, no prosecutor or defense counsel
will be automatically appointed, but counsel will be assigned
on request of the accused, as is the present practise.
The findings and sentence of every naval court martial
will be announced in open court as soon as determined. Ex-
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cept for punishments of death, dismissal, discharge, and re-
duction in rating, every sentence will become effective upon
announcement by the court. Death and dismissal require
confirmation by the President; discharge, by the Secretary
of the Navy; reduction in rating, by the convening author-
ity. The power to confirm dismissals may be delegated to
the Secretary of the Navy, and the power to confirm dis-
charges may be delegated to other naval authorities.
The independence of courts martial will be safeguarded
by relieving the convening authority of his responsibility for
the legal review of the record, by directing him to refrain
from censuring court-martial members for any finding, sen-
tence, or other exercise of judicial responsibility, by making
the judge advocate, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel
of a general court martial responsible to the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy, and by regulations to be issued by the
Secretary of the Navy under a statutory mandate to assure
that members of courts martial shall be free to perform their
duties without coercion or influence.
J. Procedure on Initial Review
Under the proposed law, a general court martial record
is to be sent to the convening authority only for his clem-
ency action. It is then forwarded to the Judge Advocate
General who conducts the legal review and may set aside
proceedings, findings, and sentence on grounds of illegality,
as distinguished from his present opinion as to legality and
mere recommendation as to action on the proceedings, find-
ings, and sentence. If legal, the record goes to the Naval
Sentence Review and Clemency Board, which has power to
remit, mitigate, or commute the sentence, except in cases
convened by the Secretary of the Navy or the President.
This board notifies the accused of the result of the action
in his case.
The record of a summary court martial or of a deck court
martial is to be sent to the convening authority only for his
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clemency action. It is then forwarded to his next senior in
the chain of command who has power to convene general
courts martial. This senior officer, who will normally have
a legal officer on his staff, conducts the legal review and de-
termines the question of legality. He also has clemency
power. After his action, the record is returned to the con-
vening authority, who publishes the result to the accused
and sends the record to the Judge Advocate General. The
record is again reveiwed for legality, and if legal and the
sentence involves a discharge, goes to the clemency hoard.
A discharge will not be executed until approved by the Sec-
retary of the Navy or his designated representative. If no
senior with general court-martial authority is, present or
reasonably available, the convening authority must, as a
practical necessity, conduct the legal review in his stead.
The power of legal review includes the power to set aside
completely, or to approve only so much of a finding of guilty
of a particular offense as involves conviction of either (1)
a lesser and included offense, or (2) an attempt to commit
the offense charged, or (3) an attempt to commit a lesser
and included offense, or (4) a lesser but not included offense.
A lesser but not included offense is defined as one which is
not included in the offense charged only because of proof
of criminal negligence instead of criminal intent. Under the
definition, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser but not in-
cluded offense of murder; negligently stranding a vessel, a
lesser but not included offense of wilfully stranding a vessel.
Clemency power includes the power to remit or mitigate
the sentence. Suspension is a form of mitigation. In addi-
tion, the Naval Sentence Review and Clemency Board will
have power to commute the sentence of any naval court
martial except a court martial convened by the Secretary of
the Navy or by the President, in which case all clemency
power reposes in the convening authority.
The Secretary of the Navy retains a reserve power to set
aside the proceedings, findings, and sentence, or to remit,
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mitigate, or commute the sentence imposed by any naval
court martial except one convened by the President, but
unless the Secretary affirmatively exercises such power, the
determinations of the Judge Advocate General as to legality
and of the reviewing authorities as to clemency are, so far
as the initial review is concerned, final.
The Navy bill expressly provides that no record is to be
returned to a court martial for reconsideration of an acquit-
tal or of a sentence with a view to increasing its severity.
This provision makes of present Navy policy a statutory
mandate.
K. Appellate Procedure
Under present practise, an accused may, by the submis-
sion of a legal brief or other documents, secure a re-review
of his case by the Office of the Judge Advocate General. It
is not technically an appeal, but, in effect, a plea, supported
by argument, to the Judge Advocate General to reverse his
previous opinion. Under the proposed law, a real appeal is
provided for. The accused is given one year from the date
on which he was informed that the initial review in his case
has been completed to make his appeal. This appeal, which
is to be made on briefs, is directed to a statutory Board of
Appeals which serves, not under the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, but in the office of the Secretary of the Navy. This
board has power to take any action which could have been
taken by the Judge Advocate General and by the Clemency
Board upon initial consideraion of the case. This means
that it may overrule former actions, and without remanding
the case, take all the necessary corrective steps with finality,
subject only to the possible exercise by the Secretary of the
Navy of his reserve powers.
After one appeal has been made and determined, or after
the passage of a year without such an appeal, the conviction
becomes final. The clemency power, of course, persists as
long as any part of the sentence remains unexecuted.
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The Board of Appeals will be constituted as the Secretary
of the Navy may prescribe. It may have as members civil-
ians, or officers, or both. It may consist of any number of
members, but three are contemplated. If the volume of ap-
peals warrants, two or more such boards may be convened.
L. Conclusion
The changes contemplated will give to the Navy a better
system of naval justice than it has ever had. They will
afford to an accused more and greater safeguards than he
now has. They will result in speedier justice, controlled in a
larger measure by legally trained personnel. The officer
personnel of the naval service will be indoctrinated at the
School of Naval Justice at Port Hueneme, California, which
has a capacity for training 200 every two months. A new
Naval Law Manual, to replace the present Naval Courts and
Boards (1937), is in process of preparation. Under the new
Navy personnel bill, lawyers will be commissioned as legal
specialists whose full time can be devoted to the Navy's legal
work. All these measures are expected to culminate in the
best possible administration of naval justice in the post-war
future.
James Snedeker.
